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Global Economic Forces and Individual 
Labor Rights: An Uneasy Coexistence 
By Alice de Jonge 
Workers’ Rights as Human Rights edited by James A. Gross. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 272pp. 
International Labor Standards: Globalization, Trade, and 
Public Policy edited by Robert J. Flanagan and William B. 
Gould IV. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003. 275pp.  
Two recent volumes of collected essays on labor rights and standards have emerged from the 
same path: academic conference to University Press. Both volumes are written from an American 
viewpoint but examine the same bundle of issues from rather different theoretical perspectives. 
International Labor Standards: Globalization, Trade, and Public Policy, edited by Robert Flanagan 
and William Gould, considers the relationships between the economic forces of globalization and 
labor conditions. The book provides an insight into the debate over whether trade should ever be 
linked to labor-standards—a debate which is sometimes portrayed as dividing many developed 
nations purportedly in favor of such linkages, from their developing nation counterparts. In 
particular, it is sometimes alleged that developing nations have been reluctant to support linking 
trade preferences to labor standards not, for example, because they lack the resources needed to 
support workers to the same extent that wealthier nations do, but simply because to do so would 
detract from the competitive advantage gained from being able to offer a ready supply of cheap 
labor. In engaging this debate, the Flanagan-Gould book challenges those who would portray 
opposing points of view in such simplistic terms. It recognizes efforts made by developing nations 
to support International Labor Organization (ILO) and other trade-labor initiatives, as well as 
pointing to the wide gap which often exists between developed nation rhetoric and practice on this 
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topic. The text also offers thoughtful insights into some of the alternative strategies (especially at the 
individual corporate level) that have been developed to improve global labor conditions.   
James Gross’ edited collection, Workers’ Rights as Human Rights, complements the Flanagan-
Gould book. It provides a new and different perspective in the assessment of US labor-relations law 
by applying those global human rights standards which are fundamental to all nations alike. There is 
some debate over what core international worker rights are and how they should be interpreted, but 
the authors generally refer to those rights, embodied in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work1. In that declaration, all members of the ILO pledged to respect, 
promote, and realize in good faith principles and rights concerning: 
• Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
• The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
• The effective elimination of child labor; and
• The elimination of discrimination in the respect of employment and occupation.
Reading these two American-centered books led me to ponder the history and recent 
developments in labor-relations in my own country, Australia—the first focus of the rest of the 
discussion provided here. It also enabled this reader to re-visit the debate over whether the 
economic forces of global trade and globalization generally have brought about a “race to the 
bottom” among developing (and to some extent, developed) nations, as each attempts to reduce the 
costs of local production while improving the competitive attractiveness of the national economy as 
a provider of cheaper labor for the foreign investor. I was somewhat surprised to find that I did not 
emerge from this re-visitation with entrenched prejudices and preconceptions reinforced. Rather, I 
found myself shaken from complacency and able to travel further along the path of developing a 
more complex understanding of the relationship between globalization and local transitions 
Recent Changes in Workers’ Rights in Australia 
James Gross’ volume is an instructive and easy-to-read work that will make a worthy addition to 
the library of any labor lawyer, or anyone interested in human rights generally. For this reader, it was 
also a real eye-opener as to just how truly appalling labor rights are in the United States compared to 
my own country. I also found it somewhat discouraging because, I fear, it provides a glimpse into 
the labor-relations future toward which Australia appears to be heading rapidly.  
As an Australian, I was born into a country which has a proud tradition of strong unionism and 
where one of the two main political parties actually calls itself “Labor.” Along with New Zealand, 
Australia’s 1904 Conciliation and Arbitration Act established a global “first”—a national-level 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (hereafter, the Commission) with powers to resolve 
industrial disputes (either of its own motion or at the instigation of a party to an industrial dispute); 
as well as the power to make and approve national-level industrial awards to regulate wages and 
labor conditions across industries. While the arbitration power was originally intended to be limited, 
the Commission quickly began to dominate (either directly or indirectly) wage determination for the 
1 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva, June 1998. Full copy of the 
declaration can be accessed online at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/. 
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majority of wage earners in Australia. The Commission maintained a series of overlapping industry 
and occupational awards which specified minimum wages and conditions. These regulations could 
be adjusted in accordance with a needs-based basic wage determination process. The regular 
National Wage Case soon became the primary vehicle for determining minimum basic wage levels, 
pay-rates and working conditions in virtually every type of employment sector.  
The arbitration legislation also encouraged the formation of trade unions by providing a system 
of registration. For unions, registration ensured recognition in law as a legal person able to sue and 
be sued. Importantly, at one time registered unions had the legal right to force an employer to 
resolve all disputes through arbitration. However, registration was also designed to place limits on 
union action. Many employers initially opposed the arbitration system but eventually came to accept 
it for a number of reasons, including its tendency to take wages out of competition (thus limiting 
unfair competition based on wage costs) and because industrial tribunals could help contain union 
industrial militancy in periods of economic buoyancy.2 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been significant decentralization of the arbitration system as
successive governments have sought to respond to competitive pressures from other countries by 
improving the “flexibility” of the Australian labor market. Much of this decentralization was begun 
during a social pact between the national “umbrella” organization for all trade unions, the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), and the Federal Labor-party government. This agreement 
between unions and government was known as “the Accord,” lasting from 1983 until the Australian 
Labor Party lost the 1996 election to a conservative coalition government.  By 1990, the ACTU, 
aware of the risks and dangers of union exclusion from policy making, agreed to support the 
government in promoting enterprise-level bargaining between union and employer within the 
individual workplace. This form of employee-employer bargaining at the level of the individual 
enterprise now forms the primary means through which wages and conditions for Australian 
workers are determined. 
The Commission, however, initially responded by rejecting and attempting to place significant 
limitations on the adoption of workplace-centered enterprise bargaining. In response, the 
government took steps to codify the principles of enterprise-level bargaining in legislation, and to 
limit the powers of the Commission. These changes were eventually enshrined in the 1993 Industrial 
Relations Reform Act, an act resulting in a number of fundamental changes to the Australian 
industrial relations system. Among other things, the Reform Act: 
• downgraded the status of awards so that Commission-determined award conditions would
only be relevant as last resort “safety nets” in the absence of satisfactory agreement on pay-
rates and conditions within the individual workplace;
• weakened the ability of the Commission to intervene in the terms and conditions of
bargains;
2 For further discussion of the politics surrounding national-level arbitration in Australia, see Nick Wailes, “Globalisation 
and National Patterns of Industrial relations: The Case of Australia”, in Roger Blanpain (ed), The Impact of
Globalisation on Employment Relations: A Comparison of the Automobile and Banking Industries in Australia and 
Korea, published in a special edition of the Bulletin of Labour Relations 45 (2002). See also D. Plowman, “Forced March:
The Employers and Arbitration”, in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds.), Foundations of Arbitration: The Origins and 
Effects and State Compulsory Arbitration, 1914-1980. Mebourne/New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
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• began the process of recasting unions’ role in bargaining as agency representation on behalf
of employees, rather than the traditional role of group representation, and
• introduced for the first time into the federal industrial relations jurisdiction the possibility of
legal non union-sanctioned agreements negotiated instead between employer and individual
(non-union member) employee(s).3 
A new Liberal and National Party Coalition government was elected in 1996. Besides overseeing 
the end of the Accord process of formalized bargains between the ACTU and the government, the 
new government also made significant changes to the institutions of industrial relations in Australia. 
One of the first pieces of legislation (after considerable delay and a number of major revisions) was 
the Workplace Relations Act of 1996 (hereafter, the WR Act). It retained the Commission and the 
status of awards, but limited awards, and therefore the use of the Commission’s arbitral powers, to 
“20 allowable matters.” No longer could Commission-determined award terms cover virtually any 
aspect of the employer-worker relationship, but only the very basic skeleton of the contract of 
employment would be provided. Award terms would be limited to the twenty things listed in the 
legislation and forming the bare essentials of the working relationship: rates of pay generally; 
ordinary hours of work; rest breaks; and annual leave and other paid and unpaid leave entitlements.4 
The WR Act also set in place a timetable for all existing awards to be stripped back to include no 
more than the 20 basic aspects of the employment relationship listed in the legislation. Workers 
seeking anything beyond such a limited set of terms would be left to negotiate their own additional 
conditions of employment on an individual basis. 
Second, the WR Act made the negotiation of non-union collective agreements easier and 
decreased the power of the Commission to vet individual enterprise agreements, and introduced into 
the federal jurisdiction legally sanctioned non-union individual contracts called Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWAs). The Act established a new set of institutions to administer these agreements 
and set out a mechanism by which employers can now use AWAs to take their employees out of 
award coverage. 
Another feature of the WR Act introduced changes designed to restrain the actions of trade 
unions. These include provisions which prohibit compulsory union membership and encourage the 
formation of break-away unions, as well as limiting the access of union officials to workplaces. The 
WR Act also significantly increased the risks associated with industrial action by increasing sanctions 
which can be applied if the action is considered “unlawful.” Strike pay is now expressly made illegal, 
and there are significant penalties for those involved in “secondary boycotts” or sympathy strikes. 
That national-level award-centered arbitration system has now been all but completely 
dismantled, and workers’ rights have been whittled away. Not only has there been significant change 
in the structure of bargaining but there has also been a major shift in the content of bargaining. One 
3 Wailes, “Globalisation,” note 2, p. 43. 
4 Section 89A of the WR Act provides that industrial disputes brought before the Commission are to be “normally 
limited to allowable award matters”. . The Commission may prevent or settle such disputes by making or varying an 
award in relation to one of the matters listed in paragraph (2) of section 89A. . Paragraph 2 then provides a list 
numbered from (a) to (t) including such matters as those mentioned here. Among the other examples of allowable 
matters listed in paragraph 2 are: (a) classification of employees; (d) piece rates, tallies and bonuses; (m) redundancy pay; 
(n) notice of termination, and; (o) superannuation.
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particularly notable shift has been in relation to working time. Research by the Australian Centre for 
Industrial Relations Research and Training into the content of agreements has revealed that changes 
to working time arrangements have been the most common areas of workplace change introduced 
through enterprise bargaining. These changes have meant, in practice, that by the mid 1990s nearly 
20 percent of the total workforce was working unpaid overtime (Wailes 2002: 33-47). 
A further area of major change has been the reduction in the percentage of workers that are 
represented by a trade union in negotiations with their employer. While unions have, in the past, 
controlled around 75 percent of the workers; that figure has now declined to less than 30 percent 
under the economic pressures of rapid change and increasing competitive pressures. Secondary 
manufacturing in Australia has declined as tariff protection for industrial products has been 
dismantled. This, in turn, has led to a rapid decline in the number of unskilled industrial jobs 
typically filled by middle-aged and older males. It was these men who once comprised the bulk of all 
union membership in Australia. Part-time and casual workers, female employees and younger and 
more highly skilled workers who can expect to have more than one or two jobs during a single 
career now make up a much greater percentage of Australia’s more service-oriented economy. Such 
individuals rarely have either the opportunity or the inclination to join a union.  
Intimately connected with the fragmentation of the award system and the decline of trade union 
membership, has been the massive growth of non-standard, or precarious, employment—especially 
in the number of workers employed on a casual basis. On a conservative estimate, by the late 1990s 
at least 45 percent of the Australian labor force was employed on a non-standard basis. Of this 
group, more than half were casual, making casual employment in Australia higher than in any other 
OECD country (Wailes 2002: 47-48).  Since both non-union and casual employees are essentially 
denied access to any of the usual rights and protections provided by industrial awards, fewer and 
fewer workers now have access to the protection of such awards. In other words, just as the number 
of American workers exempt from the minimum wage and hour standards set by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act has risen considerably, so also have more and more Australian workers been forced 
outside the protective network of national wage policy and industrial award determination.  
The situation regarding legislative protection for labor rights in the U.S., at least as portrayed 
throughout James Gross’ edited collection, would thus appear to be very similar to the situation that 
many workers in Australia, (and probably other nations as well) now find themselves experiencing. 
What the Gross volume portrays is a situation where the resolution of workplace issues is more and 
more left to the unregulated forces of the marketplace. In other words, as Thomas Moorehead 
describes it, we are led to believe that the U.S. (and, I would argue, also Australia) now has a system 
of labor laws grounded much more on the principle of individual employee rights to organize and 
bargain collectively, than on the establishment of institutional rights and privileges for organizations. 
(Moorehead in Gross: 137). 
Globalization and its Consequences for Industrial Relations 
At the macroeconomic level, labor law reforms instituted over the past decade or so may indeed 
serve Australia well—perhaps in the same ways it served the US. These labor reform policies are 
explicated by Thomas Moorhead in his chapter, “US Labor Law Serves [the United States] Well.” As 
he points out, it can often be to the benefit of the national economy for a government to develop as 
much flexibility as possible in the country’s working environment. Not only can increased labor-
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force flexibility help to boost local business confidence in investing for the future, it can also have a 
positive impact on the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) an economy is able to attract.  
A recent World Bank Policy Research Working Paper supports this latter claim. The study 
purports to explore the question “Do Foreign Investors Care About Labor Market Regulations?”5 In 
fact, however, the authors proceed to answer a somewhat different question: whether labor market 
flexibility affects foreign direct investment (FDI) flows across 25 Western and Eastern European 
countries. The level of market flexibility in an economy is defined in terms of employers’ liberty to 
initiate individual and collective workplace dismissals as well as costs of notice period (costs 
associated with laws requiring an employer to give a set period of notice before an individual 
employee can be eliminated from the payroll) and retrenchment payment requirements (additional 
payments required by law when an employee is dismissed without the required period of notice 
being provided). The study finds that greater flexibility in the host country’s labor market relative to 
that in the investor’s home country is positively associated with larger FDI inflows, and this effect is 
found to be stronger in the case of transition economies.  
In Australia, greater “flexibility” of the workforce has been, in many cases, simply another name 
for increasing employers’ powers over workers’ wages and conditions while reducing—or in some 
cases, completely eliminating—many of the most important rights and protections for workers. Nor 
does Australia appear to be unique in this respect. If we accept that greater “flexibility” generally or 
at least often equates to a degradation of labor rights, then Moorehead’s chapter and the World 
Bank Policy Paper could conceivably be used to support an argument along the following lines: (1) 
national governments seeking to raise exports and attract foreign investment commonly do so by 
reducing labor costs; (2) the easiest way for countries to reduce labor costs is to reduce, eliminate or 
fail to establish protection for minimum wage levels and otherwise to degrade labor rights, and; (3) 
this becomes easier when countries refuse to ratify ILO Conventions, even if initially voting in favor 
of the Convention concerned. In other words, when it comes to making a final commitment, 
national policy is more likely to determine a country’s approach to final ILO Convention ratification 
than the other way around. It would be rare, if ever, that national governments would allow national 
policy to be determined by the terms set down in ILO Conventions. 
This line of logic is most often employed by those who believe that economic changes 
associated with globalization are likely to produce pressures for convergence of national labor 
practices and standards towards the lowest common denominator. Those who support such a 
globalization approach6 for understanding the relationship between international economic change 
and patterns of industrial relations at the local level argue that globalization has produced significant 
increases in competitive pressures across national borders in virtually all product and factor markets, 
while increasing the geographical mobility of capital. This, it is argued, has set in motion similar 
changes in labor standards as national governments attempt to prevent the loss of productive 
investment. It is this globalization approach which, at its extreme, predicts a universal “race to the 
bottom” in terms of labor standards across all economies, and leaves little room for nationally 
5 For more information go to the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3275 (Washington DC: World Bank and 
CEPR, Development Economics Research Group, April 2004), available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
6 See eg. H. Katz and O. Darbishire, Converging Divergences: Worldwide Change in Employment Systems. Ithaca, NY: 
ILR Press/ Cornell University Press, 2000. 
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specific institutional forms of labor market organization that might otherwise provide trade union 
security or encourage the pursuit of equity as well as efficiency. The globalization approach has been 
used to explain uniform changes and pressures for change in industrial relations institutions across a 
broad range of economies. 
A second alternative perspective on the relationship between globalization and industrial 
relations can be called the “institutionalist” approach. As Nick Wailes explains, 
Institutionalist analyses have stressed the importance of national level institutions in mediating and refracting 
common economic pressures. For institutionalists, the mediating role of national level institutions explains 
persistent cross-national difference across a range of variables, including patterns of labour market regulation, 
despite significant common pressures emanating from the international economy. This approach suggests that 
the relationship between international economic change and the domestic institutions of industrial relations is 
not as simplistic as implied by the globalisation approach. It also suggests that many important variables that 
explain differences in national patterns of industrial relations are domestic and institutional rather than 
international and economic in character (Wailes 2002: 33-35).7 
Robert Flanagan’s chapter in the second volume reviewed here, International Labor Standards, 
attempts to challenge and disprove this “race to the bottom” theory, and supports a more 
institutionalist view of the globalization-labor rights relationship. 
Flanagan presents a series of complex statistical analyses of ILO members’ ratification behaviors 
in respect to ILO Conventions on the one hand, and labor conditions on the other. His analyses 
lead him to conclude first, that: 
the adoption of international labor standards does not influence labor rights and conditions, but ratification of 
ILO standards is instead a function of a country’s existing labor conditions, which improve with economic 
development. Contrary to claims by some opponents of globalization, the empirical analysis also finds that 
countries with an open trade policy or a large trade sector do not have inferior labor conditions, given their 
stage of development. (Flanagan 16) 
Second, Flanagan finds that “free trade is associated with higher, not lower, labor conditions and 
rights”. Third, and importantly, Flanagan finds that “political labor standards” (eg. Freedom of 
association and the right to form unions and to strike) do not influence labor costs.  
This last conclusion seems to undermine arguments that countries where political labor 
standards are fewer in number or not enforced attract a higher level of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a result. And, sure enough, Flanagan’s regression analysis of international differences in 
FDI flows leads him to the final conclusion that there is, “no reliable evidence that high labor 
standards reduce a country’s share of FDI”. (Flanagan 46). 
Not being a statistician or mathematician, I am not qualified to comment on the statistical side 
of Flanagan’s paper. I do, however, have a serious problem with some of his premises, as well as 
some of his conclusions. First, Flanagan presents an overly-simplified picture of the globalization 
approach, and therefore fails to understand some of the more sophisticated arguments made about 
7 For further explanation and examples of institutionalist analyses, see K. Thelen, S.Steinmo and G. Longstreth (eds.), 
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the need for reforms to overcome the more invidious aspects of the relationship between 
globalization and workers rights. 
To understand why so many reputable scholars are concerned about the effects of global 
economic forces on workers rights, we need first to understand that legal and other loopholes exist 
in every national system of labor rights protection, regardless of the number of ILO conventions 
ratified. Furthermore, no matter where a multinational enterprise chooses to locate its various 
operations, the legal duty of directors and managers is to make decisions only in the interests of the 
company and its shareholders. A duty to act in the interests of shareholders implies a corresponding 
duty to maximize profits.  And maximizing profits, in turn, implies a duty to cut operating costs to 
the lowest level consistent with efficiency. Not only do MNCs strive to reduce existing costs, 
including labor costs, as far as possible, they rarely consider incurring extra costs related to 
improving labor standards beyond required standards.   For example, it is rare that a multinational 
employer spends money on lobbying the national government to improve labor laws or ratify ILO 
Conventions, or on refurbishing and improving employees’ working environment beyond minimum 
legal standards. This is not to deny that MNCs are quite willing to incur such costs when they must 
to meet the requirements of law, or when benefits can be gained by doing so (e.g., attracting a better 
quality of employee, or additional positive publicity and market exposure for the company). 
Unfortunately, however, this is rarely the case. Rather, what is more likely to prove most profitable 
for the investor is to take advantage of every possible loophole existing in the blanket of labor rights 
protection provided for host country workers. Nor can one blame the investor for this. Rather, the 
fault lies more with the emphasis placed by Anglo-American company law on the managerial duty to 
maximize shareholders’ profits. 
Second, none of the scholars contributing to the two volumes under review here (nor any other 
serious commentator I have come across), would seriously argue that labor costs and/or labor 
standards are the sole determinant of FDI flows, or vice-versa. So Flanagan gains little by destroying 
such an assertion. Even those who argue that when countries compete to attract foreign investment 
it can have a detrimental effect on labor rights can understand that investment decisions are not 
made on the basis of labor costs alone, but on the basis of many other determinants as well.  These 
other equally, if not more, important determinants of investment decision making include the 
traditional ones pointed to by Flanagan: market size, market growth, general economic growth rate 
and degree of “openness” of the economy. In other words, even someone who is sympathetic to the 
globalization approach over a purely institutionalist analyses of the globalization-labor rights 
problem can readily accept that host government support for basic labor standards has little or no 
effect on the attractiveness of an economy for potential foreign investors. It is also readily 
acceptable that, as Robert Flanagan demonstrates, ratifications of labor standards by a government 
make no statistically significant difference to labor rights and conditions in that nation. Rather labor 
rights and conditions in an economy “are improved by free trade policies and economic growth”, 
amongst other things (Flanagan 64). 
Flanagan also fails to confront the fact that there is, inevitably, a continuing relationship between 
FDI and labor standards after the initial investment decision has been made, and after the relationship 
between foreign investor and host country has been established. Once this relationship has been 
established the shared interest of both national government and foreign investor is not necessarily to 
reduce or degrade labor rights, but at best to simply allow labor rights to “stagnate.” Workers find 
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themselves in a “Catch 22” where they must individually welcome (because it provides a basic 
livelihood) the very same foreign investment that benefits from labor force flexibilities (such as 
easier retrenchment or dismissal guidelines) that may tend to detract from the quality of employment 
security and protection for minimum working conditions. 
Nor does Flanagan have any answer to the allegation that foreign direct investors can and do 
take advantage of limitations and loopholes in the host country’s labor rights regime whenever it is 
their interest to do so. Finally, he fails to demonstrate any understanding of the policy implications 
arising from a more complex analysis of the relationship between FDI and labor standards. Policy 
proposals put forward to avoid the “Catch 22” situation created for workers when large MNCs 
become major employers in their country include: (1) providing incentives for MNCs to actively 
promote and support host nation attempts to improve labor standards, and/or; (2) imposing 
(internationally recognized) obligations on foreign investors to promote and support employee 
rights and working conditions. Flanagan does not discuss, and has nothing to say about, such 
proposals. 
These criticisms aside, Flanagan’s chapter certainly shows the flaws in simplistic conceptions of 
the globalization-labor rights relationship, and to that extent provides a very valuable addition to 
international scholarship on this question. Most of the other chapters in this volume are equally 
intellectually satisfying. Indeed, some of the chapters in this book include some of the best attempts 
to seriously grapple with the tricky questions of law and morality raised by proposals to link trade 
policy and labor standards. To be sure, the editors set out some ambitious aims for themselves, and 
see to address some very fundamental questions indeed, including:  
• What market failures justify government regulation of labor standards?
• In the absence of international regulations, will countries degrade their labor conditions in
order to obtain competitive advantages?
• Why should international standards override domestic political processes in determining a
country’s level of labor standards?
• What are the most effective forums for the development of international labor standards?
• What evidence is available on the comparative efficacy of increased trade and growth versus
labor standards as mechanisms for improving labor standards?
The beauty of the book is that it does not, in general, attempt to answer these questions in any 
prescriptive fashion for the reader. Rather, it provides the reader with at least some of the knowledge 
and the logical linkages required to answer the questions posed above for herself. For those issues 
on which reasonable persons can and do often disagree, authors of different chapters present both 
sides of the debate with clarity and force. There is a genuine and vigorous debate which occurs 
between the contributors to this volume—one based on mutual respect and the use of evidence, 
rather than rhetoric—which stands in favorable contrast to the more stridently rhetorical tone of 
some of the chapters in James Gross’ edited collection. 
The Flanagan-Gould edited collection also provides a thoughtfully analytical and practical 
discussion of the various possible solutions that have been suggested and are being implemented to 
help alleviate the more destructive aspects of globalization on labor rights and standards. Among 
these are the levels of effectiveness of treaties, trade agreements, soft law, mandatory codes and 
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voluntary codes of conduct. For example, Gould’s chapter, “Labor Law for a Global Economy,” 
takes a generally positive view of the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Labor Side Agreement on labor rights and standards in Mexico, arguing, inter alia, that “it 
seems clear that Mexico has become more democratic since NAFTA has been in existence” (Gould 
in Flanagan and Gould: 105). Enrique de la Garza Toledo’s closer examination of the Mexico case 
reveals, however, that the truth is more complex. After a careful look at labor union activity and 
government labor policies in Mexico, de la Garza Toledo concludes that “decision making power 
has not been delegated to the workers, wages are low, and labor is high-intensity….The unilateral 
employer form still prevails and the possibility of reaching agreements with the unions in the 
workplace is more rhetoric than real” (de la Garza Toledo in Flanagan and Gould: 253).  
One particularly satisfying chapter in this collection is Gary Field’s paper discussing 
“International Labor Standards and Decent Work: Perspectives from the Developing World.”
Field’s chapter sets out in a simple, straightforward fashion what Gould calls “the Uneasy Case for 
International Labor Standards.” Field puts forward the essence of both sides of the debate in an 
easy-to-read but not overly simplistic manner. It is a style that draws the reader along with it every 
step of the way towards a carefully reasoned and well-balanced conclusion. The author highlights the 
strengths and weaknesses of each side of the debate and explains clearly the rationale behind his 
preferred resolution. This chapter would have made a good first chapter of the book (it actually 
comes as the third chapter) precisely because it sets out the essence of the problem so beautifully.  
Field is an economist; I make this point because I am not an economist and tend to be wary of 
economic theory used as the basis for discussing social/human rights questions. Yet I found myself 
persuaded by Field’s balanced viewpoint that, “[s]ome kinds of work (slavery, indentured servitude, 
forced labor, the worst forms of child labor) are an outrage wherever they occur and they should be 
prohibited….Certain basic human rights in the workplace should …be guaranteed to workers – in 
particular the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining…[but it is not] possible to 
pass laws or set standards to assure other important and sought after conditions of work [such as] 
earnings levels and other conditions of employment…[which] can best be achieved through broad-
based economic growth…” (Field in Flanagan: 61). 
Reading the Flanagan-Gould collection can shake us from any pre-existing prejudices and lead 
us toward a more complex understanding of how global economic forces and local experiences in 
the workplace interact with and affect each other. It can help us to break the deadlock which 
currently exists in the debate about the relationship between international economic changes and 
national patterns of industrial relations. Both globalization theorists and institutionalists can accept 
that globalization creates identical economic pressures across all countries. What they disagree about 
is the extent to which this common pressure is determinant of national patterns of industrial 
relations. Globalization theorists take evidence of convergence as demonstrating the explanatory 
significance of international economic change, and the relative unimportance of domestic 
institutional factors. For institutionalists, continued diversity between countries is taken as evidence 
of the explanatory significance of institutions and the relative unimportance of economic factors. To 
break the deadlock in this debate we need to construct a more complex model which combines 
elements of both the globalization and the institutionalist perspectives on the problem of global 
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economics and individual workers’ rights. A more complex model could, for example, regard 
national institutions (or even regional institutions), of industrial relations8 as the product of policy 
coalitions formed between different states; and between the state, employers and/ or national labor 
organizations. These coalitions are formed in the context of particular patterns of economic 
integration in the global economy. This approach seeks to explain the relationship between 
international economic change and national patterns of employment relations by mapping the 
impact of international (and regional) changes on the interests of elements of this policy coalition 
and the stability of the policy coalitions which underpin national institutions. The detailed local 
economic study of the Mexican case presented by Enrique de la Garza Toledo is particularly 
instructive in this regards, but so also are the other chapters in the Flanagan-Gould volume, albeit in 
different contexts and at different levels.  For this reader at least, the book has helped to enhance 
understanding of local developments in Australian labor market law and practice by placing such 
changes within an international global context.  
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